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LANDOWNER'S DUTY TO STRANGERS .ONHIS PREMISES
-AS DEVELOPED IN THE IOWA DECISIONS
It is one thing to know a general rule of common law. It is
another to know the application of the general rule. its variations
and-exceptions, in a particular state. Both are important. Without the first, the lawyer becomes the mere tradesman. Worse than
,that for him, he is often helpless, for with all the gray mu e and
:spotted cow cases to which a benevolent digester directs him he
does not sense the legally significant facts so that he. can recognize
an authority when he sees it. Without the second, even the- lawyer
with a grasp of fundamentals is at- a disadvantage, for a single
local case may upset the whole, course of a carefully 'reasoned
,analysis. This and other discussions of Iowa law which appear in
the pages of this magazine are published with the hope that an
exposition and analysis of local decisions will be helpful to the
profession. In general they blaze no new paths in jprisprudence.
If they aid in a better understanding of what we already have their
publication is justified.
In the present discussion, it is the purpose to discuss general
principles of tort liability governing the occupier of land for harm
suffered by outsiders on the premises. I have used the word
"strangers" n order to connote a meaning which would exclude
a discussion of those who stand in special relations to the landowner, as master and servant, landlord .and tenant, and carrier
and passenger. Soide. cases of this kind'are cited but only when
depending on general rules of law, .'ot limited-to the peculiar
relation.
TReSPASSeS

It is not necessary here to discuss instances where the law will
justify one in entering. another's premises without his permission.
Authority hardly seems needed for the undisputed rule that "every
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unauthorized and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of an"
other is a trespass,"' and an unsupported dictum to the 'contrary
which appears in an early Iowa decision may be disregarded 2
To the trespasser the land6wner owes no duty to put his premises
in safe condition or repair,3 or even to 'give warning of latent
danger.' This is but an instance of the favor with which the
landowner has always been regarded by the common law. So
long as he stays within his own boundaries, he may, with few ex-.
ceptions, use the piemises as he sees fit. The" fact that eople do
in fact trespass on the land of others puts no obligation on the
owner to make things safe for them. But the immunity is given
him only in using the premises for his own affairs. If he creates
the dangerous condition for the purpose of harming the trespasser
he is liable for the latter's injuries. The Iowa "spring gun" de5
cision is a leading case, on this point.
This broad immunity from responsibility is available' only to
the rightful occupant of the land. If the defendant whose dangerous agency-has caused another injury is himself a-trespasser or
a licensee on the land of the owner, he cannot escape liability on
the sole ground that the plaintiff's presence on the land was a legal
wrong against the owner. The liability will depend upon the defendant's having acted with due care under the circumstances.
Should the general rule granting immunity to the landowner for
injuries resulting to trespassers from dangers in his premises apply
Ruffin, C. J., 'in Dougherty v. Stepp, 1 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 371.
'The statement Is: "'Itis, perhaps, true that, by walking-upon a railroad track at points away from public crossings, persons are not technically trespassers ....... A person who, for pleasure or from curiosity, enters
a manufactory, and walks among the machinery ...... is not a trespasser
in a legal sense." McAllister v. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 395, 397. Such a person,
certainly is a trespasser, unless a license can be implied, a question hereafter discussed.
'Burner v. Higman etc. Co., 127 Iowa'580; Davis v. Bonaprte, 137 Iowa
196; UpP v. Darner,150 Iowa 403, 407.'
'A striking instance is Sktton v. W. "T. & S. R. Co, 78 N. J. L. 17, where
the deceased, trespasstnig on ral'oad land, stepped upon an unguarded
electrically, charged rail. No warning of' danger had been given. His
representative was denied recovery 'for his death. A, dictum to the contrary by McClain, C. J., in Ambroz v. ' lht. anut Power Co., 131 Iowa 336,
339, is not in accordance with authority
'Hooker v. Miter, 37 Iowa 613. See also Davis v. Bonaparte, 137 Iowa
196, 205.
Connell v. Electric By. Co., 131 Iowa 622. The poiit Is discussed, in
dkaer fashion in Guinn V. D. & A. 21e1. Co., 72 N. J. L. 276.
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when the victim is'a child? This question has been the subject of
hot controversy and has given rise to a multitude of decisions, referred to as the "Turn-Table" or "Attractive Nuisance" cases. It
is not necessary here to review the well known arguments set forth
with much vigor, and often asperity, on one side or the other, nor
tb determine the extent to which the doctrine has been carried in
7
other jurisdictions.
We could think more clearly on this subject if we ceased to
camouflage the landowner's liability with a setting of vituperative
epithets about one who has "allured," "enticed" or "trapped"
innocent children. We need no new rules of law to care for the
man who would actually do such an act. The'fact is, as everyone
knows, that the landowner has the dangerous object on the place
in the course of his use of the premises. The existence of something that childien like to play with on a man's land does notmean that he invites the children to use it, dicta to the contrary
notwithstanding.8 With equal truth we could say that a railroad invites a pedestrian walking along a muddy road to use its
well drained track for his travel.
We should admit that a child who comes without permission to
play upon a turn-table or anything else on another's land is technically a trespasser. And children are at law liable for trespasses
the same as adults. The admission does not necessarily mean that
the proprietor incurs no responsibility by reason of the unwelcome
visit. The structure of civilization would not be shaken if the law
made an exception in favor of the child by cutting down the landowner's freedom from liability to trespassers. Such a change might
impair the logical consistency of our rule. But logic is not necessarily law. "The law is a practical science, having to do with the
affairs of life, [and] any rule is unwise if in its general application
it will not as a usual result serve the purposes of justice.' '
The *hole question seems to be whether it is better policy to leave
the landowner with his almost absolute immunity, or to imposea
duty on him to safeguard trespassing children too young to care
for themselves. The chief diffieulty with the answer made by
most authorities, that there is an obligation owed to the child, is
'Judge Jeremiah Smith, in two well reasoned articles, sets out the
negative answer to the question in 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 434. Even notes
listing cases on the point are too numerous to set out here. They are
listed in L. R. A. Index, heading, "Negligence" §§ 23, 23a.
fAs for example in Wilmes v. R. Co., 175 Iowa 101, 108.
Alen, J., in Spade v. Ly.nn etc. R.- Co., 168 Mass. 285.
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that of determining the extent of the duty. It is common knowledge that nearly everything new is attractive to childish curiosity.
A wood pile, garden toQls, machinery, fires, ponds, what will not
make a setting for a fine new game ? Is the landowner, then, to be
compelled to lock up everything against youngsters never initiated
into the rules of trespass q. c. f.? Courts allowing recovery for
an injury on a railroad turn-table have not infrequently met with
difficulty in deciding how far the doctrine was to be followed.
The Supreme Court of Iowa allowed a trespassing child to recover for injuries sustained on a turn-table in the well known
Edginjto case in 1902.10 The carefully reasoned and thorough opinion of Weaver, ., reviews the cases and discusses principles. The property owner, says the Court, is not an insurer of
the safety of children who come upon the premises. "His obligation is simply that which attaches to every member of society when
he undertakes to exercise a personal right in a manner which may
affect the welfare or safety of another member,--the obligation of
reasonable care." Without quibbling the duty of reasonable care
is recognized, despite plaintiff's status as a trespasser. Precautions
demanded will vary, naturally, with the degree of danger and the
remoteness or proximity of the premises from places where children
are to be expected.
It is worthy of note, however, that the Court, with but two exceptions, has denied recovery in every case since the Edgington decision that has come before it, where plaintiff's claim was based
upon this "Attractive Nuisance" do6trine, though several timei
it has approved and affirmed the rule of that case.One of
"Bdgington v. Biy. Co., 1.16 Iowa 410.

Two previous turntable cases

had been decided for defendant on the grounds of plaintif's contributory negligence. Merryman v. Ry. Co., 85 Iowa 634; Carson v.
By. Co., 96 Iowa 583.
"The qases are: Brown v. Canning Co., 132' Iowa 631, belt running

over cylinder used to elevate corn; A~ndersov. v. By. Co., 150 Iowa 465,
uninsulated electric wires on top of storage house, to which boy had
Jum3ed from top of a freight car; Hart v. Brick d Tile Co., 154 Iowa
741, shaft in an "old blacksmith shop"; Wilmea v. RBy. Co, 175. Iowa
101, bent rail in a heap of railway wreckage; Smith v. By. Co., 177
Iowa 243, smouldering fire in refuse dump at terminal; Carlisle v.
Sells Plotb Co., 180 Iowa 549, unloading circus near school grounds;
Davis v. Malvern L. & P. Co., 173 N. W. 262, barbed wire fence surrounding pole carrying electric wires; Mas8ingham v. Ry. Co., 179
N. W. 832, cofferdam about an abutment of a railroad bridge; Blough
"v. By. Co., 179 N. W. 840, pond or barrow pit on railroad right of way.
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the cases where recovery was allowed was another suit to recover
for injuries sustained on defendant's turn-table. 12 In the
second, recovery was allowed a boy who was hurt when his fingers
were caught in a block and tackle arrangement used to hoist a
telephone cable.' 3
The apparatus was used on a public street
near a school, and there was no one- to guard it. It is true of course
that the child was a trespasser in touching another's property.' 4
But he had as much right on the street as defendant, whose defense
must have rested on some other doctrine than landowner's immunity. It is not meant to intimate that the decisions subsequent to
the Edgington case are wrong. The course of decision does show,
it is submitted, that our Court is going to be very careful in applying the attractive nuisance doctrine. That is good sense, for iA
some states the rule seems to have swept the courts off their feet.
One further liability of a landowner for defects in his premises
to one coming without permission is to be noted. If the premises
adjoin a highway the landowner must not make an excavation or
create obstructions so close to the way that travel is unsafe by reason thereof. The true test for liability is said in an English case
to be "whether the excavation be substantially adjoining the
way. " 15 The question seems not to have come up in Iowa. In
Earl v. Cedar Rapids et al.,'8 the plaintiff recovered for injuries
sustained in falling into an unguarded cellarway, which projected
from land of one of the defendants into the public street. The
case does not therefore involve liability for such danger existing
entirely on defendant's own land adjoining the highway, nor even
the responsibility of one who gives his adjacent premises the appearance of being part of the highway.Y Authorities in other
jurisdictions are abundant enough to establish the duty as a rule
of law.' 8
12Taylor v. Ry. Co., 180 Iowa 702.
uAshbach v. Iowa Tel. Co., 165 Iowa 473.

"Judge Weaver emphasizes this point in the Edgington case in
discussing another decision based on a street accident, used as an authority for the attractive nuisance doctrine. See pp. 421, 422 of the
decision.
'5Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire etc. Co., 4 Hurl. & Nor. 67.
"126 Iowa 361.
"On this point, see note in 51 L. IL A. (N. S.) 1215.
"Collections of cases may be found in 26 L. R. A. 686; 5 L. I. A.

(N. S.) 733.
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Liability of the landowner for injuries received through acts
done to the trespasser will in many instances depend upon whether
the injured person's presence was actually known to the defendant.
The trespasser whose presence is unknown to the landowner cannot
recover for injuries he receives. The reason is not because by his
trespass the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, as our
Court has on occasion intimated.19 An unseen trespassing child too
young to be negligent himself cannot recover any more than an
adult2 0 The reason the unseen trespasser cannot recover is that no
duty is owed to him. This is clearly set out in two Iowa decisions,2a and shows that the statement in"Murphy v. B. Co...°b to the
effect that the only difference between the duty owed to trespasser
or licensee""would be upon the facts constituting the measure of
diligence required" is incorrect. There being no duty to the trespasser, no diligence is required. Since there is no duty, he pcaot
avail himself of rules of the company requiring signas and a lookout. 20 ' "Actionable negligence is the breach of a duty owing by
defendant to plaintiff, and where there is no duty there is no negligence," says Judge.Deemer.2 1 Rules in other states vary. In some
jurisdictions landowners, if they are railroads, are required by
decision or statute, to watch for trespassers. 22 Our own cases are
"In Masser v. Ry. Co., 68 Iowa 602. Contributory negligence will be
a bar to an action based on defendant's negligence- whether plaintiff is
a trespasser or not. And some cases may rest on that ground. See
Murphy v. B. Co, 38 Iqwa 539; McAllister v. By. Co., -64 Iowa 395.
-Burg v. By. Co., 90 Iowa 106; Thomas v. RBy. Co., 93 Iowa 248.
"aDeemer, J., in Thomas v. By. Co., 93 Iowa 248, 255, and' Salinger, J.,
in Papich v. By. Co., 183 Iowa 601.
2b3O Iowa 539.
ICBury .v. By .Po, 90 Iowa 106.
21In Upp y. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 406. This Is clearly set out by
Deemer, J., in Thomas v. Ry. Co., 93 Iowa 248, 255, and by Salinger, J., in
Papich v. R. Co, 183 Iowa 601, and of course shows that'the staterhent
in Murph y v. B. Co, 38 Iowa 539, to the effect that the only difference
between duty owed to trespasser or licensee "would be upon the facts
constituting the measure of diligence required" is incorrect. 'There being
no duty to the trespasser, no diligence Is required. . Since there is no
duty, 'he cannot avail himself of rules of -the company requiring signals
and a lookout. Burg v. RBy. 0., 90 Iowa 106.
"For a decision so holding, and discussion, see 2. Iowa Law Bulletin
98. Collections of cases on this point, setting out the varying circumstances when such lookout is required, may be found in'25 1. X. A.
287 and 8 ' & R. A. (N. S.) 1069.
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clear. Railroads are not required to watch for trespassers; they
owe no duty until, the uninvited visitor is actually discovered;
and it is immaterial whether he be infant or adult. 28 Of course
the same exemption from duty would apply to other landowners.
Indeed where the courts have declared a duty to watch for trespassers, it seemsonly to-apply to railroads.
This freedom from responsibility for the undiscovered trespasser is not adequately explained by saying that his presence is
not to be anticipated. 2' As a matter of fact, people frequently do
trespass on the land of others, especially on railroad property,
and every one knows it. But the jury may not consider the frequency of trespassing at a given point, even in determining the
question of actual knowledge. 5 The reason must be fundamentally
the same as the exemption of responsibility for condition of the
premises: that it is a socially desirable policy to allow a man to
conduct his own lawful business on his own land in his own way,
without the burden of watching for ,and guarding those who come
there without permission or right. If this is !not sound policy, or
if it once was, and is no longer, then the law ought to be changed.
But a court would hardly upset a rule so firmly established as
this one is and if a change is to be made, it will have to come
through legislation. The very important practical question, what
facts will change a plaintiff from trespasser to licensee, will be
discussed later.
If the trespasser is actually discovered by the landowner, an entirely different situation is presented. Is the proprietor now to be
allowed to disregard the rights of this man as a human being because he has come without right? The trespasser is no outlaw,
with a price upon his head. Probably mere knowledge of the pres.
"Masser v. By. Co, 68 Iowa 602; Burg v. By. Co., 90 Iowa 106; Thomas
v. By. Co., 93 Iowa 248; S. C. 103 Iowa 649; S. C. 114 Iowa 169; Pulley v.
By. Co., 94 Iowa 565; Baker v. R. Co., 95 Iowa 163; Heiss v. Ry. Co,
103 Iowa 590; Earl v. By. Go., 109 Iowa 14; Purcell v. By. 0o, 109 Iowa
628; Clernans v. By. Co, 128 Iowa 394; Graham v. By. go., 131 Iowa 741;
Myers v. Ry. Co., 152 Iowa .330; Papic v. By. Co., 183 Iowa 601; Miles v.
By. Go., 184 Iowa 461; Trotter v. By. Co, 185 Iowa 1045. The rule is the
same as to stock trespassing upon a fenced right of way. Mears v. By.
(Oo., 103 Iowa 203; Johnson v. By. Co, 122 Iowa 556; B eynolds v. B. Co,
159 Iowa 317. Cases on the liability of the railroad for loss of stock
on a right of way not fenced as required by statute (Compiled Code 1919,
J§ 5074, 5075) need not be here discussed. See 3 MoCLS-m's DIxaST 3397.
"As in Murphy v. R. Co., 38 Iowa 539.

OT/oma v. By. 06, 93 Iowa 248.
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ence of the trespasser would place no duty on the lando~vner's part
to give him warning, even of hidden dangers in the condition of
the premises. The law in general requires no man to play the good
Samaritan, and it is hard to see how the wrongful presence of the
plaintiff on defendant's land would increase the former's rights.28
But there is a fundamental distinction between failing to help
a man and doing him harm, between the priest and the Levite who
merely passed by on the other side, and the thieves who beat and
wounded the victim in the parable. Failing to do a thing and doing
27
it badly, are wholly different things in the eyes of the law.
All courts agree that the trespasser has some rights. He must
not be intentionally harmed; even in ejecting him no more force
can be used than is reasonably necessary. 28 Beyond this, authorities
are divided. One rule, that of the majority, often calleji the Michigan rule, gives the seen trespasser the protection of ordinary care
on the part of the landowner, the usual test for responsibility for
injurie sustained through negligence. By the other rule, called
the Massachusetts rule, the trespasser can claim only freedom from
reckless and wanton misconduct, something very much akin to
intentional injury. 29 The Michigan rule gives the trespasser the
rights of an ordhnary human being, no more, no less. If it is too
-See the language of the Court in Buch v. AmorjMfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257.
2IThis refers to cases where there Is, between the parties no relation,
either impoged by law or assumed by the parties, creating a duty of
affirmative action. See on the subject of such duties, "The Moral Duty to
Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability", F. H. Bohlen, 56 Amer. L. Reg.
(O.S.) 217.
2 I C. L. 557, 558. In Adams v. By. Co., 156 Iowa 31, plaintiff was a
trespasser on defendant's premises in a helplessly intoxicated condition.
He was ejected and suffered injuries from exposure. The court said
that even in exercising the privilege of ejecting him, defendants must
exercise reasonable precaution for his safety.
OThe two rules are discussed, with a strong argument for the Michigan
rule in an article "Duty to Seen Trespassers", by Judge Robert J.Peaslee,
27 Harv. L. Rev. 403. Sometimes they are carelessly stated in alternative language as though each meant the same thing. See 20 Mt C. I. 60.
Statement of the landowner's liability in terms which thus require
the existence of a substantially criminal state of mind as does the "reckless and wanton misconduct" test, is said to have come from the fact that
the common laW writ of trespass, which was in its essence criminal, in.
eluded within its scope offences committeed by a landowner upon his
own premises. See Prof. P. H. Bohlen, in 69 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 237, 238,
March, 1921.
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much trouble to take ordinary care to avoid hurting him, he can be
ejected. Until that is done, is he not entitled to as much care from
the defendant as any strangerI
A long line of Iowa decisions announces and applies to varying
facts the rule that after discovering a trespasser upon the preir ises,
there is a duty upon the landowner and his servants to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury.30 Along with this formidable array
of decisions are found scattering cases in which statements appear,
usually as gratuitious dicta, announcing the test of intentional
wrongdoing, or wanton and reckless misconduct as a criterion for
defendant's liability. Some of these come from indiscriminate
citations of cases from other jurisdictions, without careful attention
to our own decisions 1 If a 6lear statement by a judge can ever
settle the law, surely the following.one by Judge McClain in Gregory v. Wabash Railroad Co., 32 should have left no room for vascillation in this State. He is speaking of the duty to a seen trespasser,
in answer to an argument raised by defendant who complained of
an instruction given by the trial judge.
"It may be- true that in some of the cases of this character thiq court
has referred to the willful and -wanton character of the acts of railroad
employes in failing to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury after
the trespasser was seen; but certainly this court has never announced
the rule that under such circumstances the company will not be liable
unless the conduct of its employes was intentional, willful, or wanton; and,
so far as we can discover, the rule uniformly adhered to has been that if,
after the employes in charge of the train became aware of danger to a trespasser on the track, they can, by the exercise of such care as a reasonably
prudent person would exercise under the circumstances-that is, the highest
possible degree of care in view of the fact that human life is involvedavert such danger, it is their duty to do so; and the company will be liable
for their failure in this respect, which failure will be attributed to the company as negligence."

This. clear statement seems to have been overlooked in a small
group of cases since which have reverted to the "wanton and reckless" formula. Where they apply it, however, they say that the
"McAlister v. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 395;. Masser v. By. Co., 68 Iowa 602;
Eflampft v. Ry. Co., 84 Iowa 71 (semble); Burg v. By. Go, 90 Iowa 106;
Sutfin v. RBj. Co., 95 Iowa 304; Barnhart v. Ry. Co., 97 Iowa 654; Neet v.
By. Co., 106 Iowa 248; Purcellv. By. Co4 109 Iowa 628; Scott v. iy. Co., 112
Iowa 54; Farrell.v.RBy. Co., 123 Iowa 690; Clemans v. RBy. (7o., 128 Iowa
394; Graham v. RBy. Co., 131 Iowa 741; Myers -v. R. Co., 152 Iowa 330;
Clemens v. Ry.Co., 163 Iowa 499.
uGwynn v. DuffielZ, 66 Iowa 708; Earl v. R. Co., 109 Iowa 14.
0126 Iawa 230, 238.
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finding of "willful negligence" can be sustained by evidence showing lack of due care after. the trespasser and his danger are discovered. This reaches the same result as the straight test of negligence, but the language is confusing and inaccurate.83
What constitutes the exercise of ordinary care to a seen trespasser will vary with the circumstances. An eMgineer in charge
of a train does not need to stop upon discovery of an object on the
track, nor even if he sees that the object is a human being.8 ' The
engineer may assume that an adult, in apparent full possession of
his faculties will get out of the way. It is when it becomes apparent
that he is oblivious to danger, or cannot get out of it, that drastic
action must be taken.3 5 The case is different with children-their
very presence on the track denotes danger.38 Generally the question of the sufficiency of precautions taken is a jury question, and
the verdict will not be disturbed when it finds support in the evidence.3 7
One line of decisions is hard to reconcile with the general rule
that the seen trespasser may demand due care from the proprietor
to avoid injury to him. The case of Denny v. C. B. I. & P. By. 0o.a
presents the typical set of facts. The plaintiff sued for injuries
sustained by his minor daughter. She, by misrepresenting herself
to be a relative of an employee, had procured a pass on the railroad.
While on her return journey, the passenger train collided with a
freight train, caused by a misplaced switch. It seems to be granted
that this was negligently caused. Yet in the absence of a showing
OTarashonsky v. R. (o, 139 Iowa 709 (note, too, that- the child inJured was a licensee); Trotter v. By. (Jo., 185 Iowa 1045. .Ambroz v. Light
& Power Co., 131 Iowa 336, seems to go even further, for it talks 'as if
this finding of wantonness might be sustained if steam was suddenly discharged without warning -If defendant knew people were reasonably
likely to be in front of the. pipe. Is there then a duty to a trespasser

not discovered, but who could be expected?
The statement of the willful injury rule by Salinger, T., in Paplil v.
Ry,. (0., 183 Iowa 601, Is not supported by the very authorities givel,
and is not necessary to the decision.
"Burg v. By. (O, 90 Iowa 106, 121.
,-Dfree v. Ry. (o., 155 Iowa- 544. Acoord, RutWeord Y.,1. C
7o., 142

Iowa 744.
!'Burg v. Ry. (0, supra; 2hmas v. Ry. (0., 114 Iowa 169. See further,
due care as to children, Walterm y. R. Co., 41 Iowa" 71; Sutzin v. RV. '(o.,
95 Iowa 304.
"Clemans v. R. (o., 128 Iowa 39"; Myers v. By. (6., 152 Iowa .830.
'160 Iowa 461.
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of willful or intentional wrongdoing by defendant, the plaintiff was
denied recovery. This decision seems to represent a general rulethat the injured person in such a case can only claim the right to be
free from willful or intentional injury. " " It is supported by authority even in Iowa where for years there had been a statute making
railway companies liable for all damages sustained by any person,
including employees, for negligence, mismanagement, or willful
wrongs.40
Consider the situation on principle and general authority for a
moment. It is conceded that a plaintiff in the situation set forth
is not a passenger; he is not entitled to an instruction in his favor
calling for that peculiar degree of care supposed to be awarded
persons of this description. 41 We may call him a trespasser if he
fraudulently avoids paying his fare.42 If the injury comes to him
before his is discovered"3 the authorities already discussed would
deny a recovery because no duty is owed him. If it .occurred
through defects in car or track, he could not complain that premises
were not made safe for him, under authorities also set out above.
But when he is negligentlr hurt after his presence is known, why
is he nQt entitled to recovery just as much as the man hurt while
trespassing on the right of way? If a conductor negligently ejects
him from a inoving train, the company is liable.'4 Is the case presented different because the particular employee whose negligence
caused the injury did not-know of the plaintiff's presence? Such
knowledge does not seem to be required in order to give the seen
trespasser in other places protection from negligence. In a leading
case on the subject 5 the plaintiff trespassing in defendant's
circus tent, was hurt by the explosion o a giant firecracker, the
explosion being part of the entertainment provided. It is exceedingly improbable that the clown who set off the firecrackek knew
of the presence of this individual boy in the audience. The Court
HurcmsoN oN COsm
, 3rd ed. § 1001.
9§1307 Code of 1873; § 5090 Compiled Code of 1919. See (7onran v.
Ry. Oo., 67 Fed. 522. Way v. By. Co., 73 Iowa 466, bringing in "gross

negligence" as a test was criticized in Barl v. Ry. Jo., 109 Iowa 14, 17.
The "gross negligence" doctrine was repudiated in the Denny case, supra.
"'Way v. Ry. Go., 84 Iowa 48.
"Stone v. By. Co., 47 Iowa 82.
"As was the case in Graham v. By. o., 131 Iowa 741.
"Benton v. Ry. Co., 55 Iowa 496. And see on the liability here the.
striking case of- Adadm v., By. Co., in note 28, saupra.
"Herrickc v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384.
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did not require it. It was enough that his presence was known
to entitle him to due care.
Does the law distiiguish the trespasser in the car and the trespasser on the track because the former is felt, consciously or unconsciously, to-be a greater offender? Trespass on land, especially
railroad land, is a most venial offense; everyone commits it on
occasions. Evading fare is more serious. Has that influenced
the course of decision? If it has, it would seem to be what a colleague calls "maladjusted civil penology."
The punishment
doesn't fit the crime. For an offense comparatively trivial, for
which the punishment would ordinarily be a light fine, this plaintiff must be a cripple for life without redress. The penalty is too
heavy for the wrong done.
LicENsEaxs
We may consider a licensee one who comes on another's premises
for his own purposes solely, with the owner's acquiesence or permission, through n'o contractual agreement with the owner.B
With regard to claims for injuries resulting from the condition of
the premises, the licensee is little better off than the trespasser. He
is not liable at law for his entry. But his situation resembles that
of the trespasser in that he can claim from the landowner no general duty to make the premises safe or comfortable for his reception. He takes the place as he finds it. If he insists on looking his
gift horse in the mouth, the law will. not listen to his complaints
about what he has. found."'
In one respect only does the licensee have an advantage over the
trespasser regarding the condition of the premises of the landowner. He is entitled to warning of hidden dangers the existence
of 'which is known to the licensor."' Even this duty on the licen"29 Cyc. 451.
"O'Donnell v. Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 102; Burner v. Higman & Skinner Co.,
127 Iowa 580; Daigs v. Bonaparte, 137 Iowa 196, 205 (note that in this
case Judge Deemer,- saying that defendant is liable' only for intentional
or wanton injury is speaking in a case which Involved not liability for
acts done, but condition of the premises); Rutherford v. By. Co., 142 Iowa
744, 754 (here it is said, obiter, the duty is no higher than to a trespasser. This is not quite accurate); Wendt v. Akron, 161 Iowa 338;
Wilmes v. a. Co., 175 Iowa 101. For general collection of cases, see 13
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126.
'"29 CYc. 450. Campbell v. Boyd, 88 N. C. 129, is an excellent illustration,
though the language goes beyond that necessary to care for the facts. De-
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sor's part is sometimes denied. 49 The point seems not to have come
up for decision in Iowa, but the duty was recognized in a dictum
in one decision.50 A persuasive analogy for this protection to the
licensee is found in cases making a gratuitous bailor of a chattel
liable for injuries sustained by the bailee in its use, when, and
only when, the bailor knew of a concealed defect and gave no
warning.51 Should not the same rule apply to the permissive use
of land?
Turning from responsibility for the premises themselves to
acts done to the licensee while on the premises, expressions are not
wanting that the only duty to licensees is to refrain from reckless
and wanton injury. 2 But Iowa cases are clear that the duty is
higher than this. Due care must be used to avoid injuring the
licensee by affirmative acts of iiegligence. 3 This is to be expected,
when the seen trespasser is given such protection. But the licensee
may not only ask that care be used with regard to him after his
presence is known, but that due care be used to discover him as
well. This is clear under the Iowa decisions, however confused
fendant watched plaintiff, a licensee,, start across a bridge which defendant knew to be unsafe, and which did in fact collapse and injure
the licensee.
*"Watson v. iy. Co., 41 Colo. 138, 92 Pac. 17. The danger in this ease
was perfectly open however. In 20 R. C. L. 59 the-duty as to trespassers
and licensees is said to be the same as to condition of premises. It is
doubtful from the very general language whether this particular point
was considered.
"Wendt v. Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 345, cited in Wiimes v. Ry. Co., 175
Iowa 111, 113.
' See Johnson v. Bull7rd Co., 1,11 Atl. 70 (Conn.), and comment, with
citation of cases, in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 93 (Nov. 1920), and 6 Cornell IA.
Quart. 86 (Nov. 1920).
""His presence on the company's land being merely permissive .........
the only duty which the company owed him was to abstain from acts
willfully injurious." Fitzpatrick v. Cumberland etc. (Jo., 61 N. J. L. 378.
OCases in the following note are applicable here. See in addition
Reifsnyder v. Ry. Co., 90 Iowa 76; Scott v. Ry. Co., 112 Iowa 54; CJroft v.
By. Co., 132 Iowa 687; Crolt v. Biy. (o., 134 Iowa 411. A fortiori, one who
is on the premises as a licensee must exercise care with regard to those
rightfully there. Fishbur&v. Ry. (Jo., 127 Iowa 483. It is hardly necessary to add that the licensee may preclude himself from recovery by
his own contributory negligence. Richards v. By. (o., 81_Iowa 426.
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authority may be elsewhere,"' and careless dicta to the contrary
may be disregarded.55
The broad distinction then, is between the duty to maintain safe
premises, which the licensee may not claim, and the duty to refrain
from affirmative acts of negligence, which he may. Can a licensee
complain of injuries suffered by a change in the condition of the
premises, which makes them less safe for him than at the time
the permission was granted? Suppose that the plaintiff, by acquiescence, was allowed to cross a piece of land which the owner
used in stone quarrying operations. Could he complain if in the
course of the business the operations gradually extended toward
the path so it eventually became unsafe to use? Would it not be
a stronger case for him if the change was made suddenly, without
warning, and he was hurt? Even on such facts recovery has been
denied. 10 But there is good authority holding that a sudden change
making the premises unsafe, when made without warning, gives an
7
injured licensee a cause of action.
The point has had little discussion in Iowa. It has been held
that one who dug a well on unfenced land, in a county where there
was no enactment prohibiting stock from running at large, and
did not guard it, was liable for the loss of a horse which fell in.58
The case of Wendt v. Akron" comes fairly close to the point. The
plaintiff by defendant's permission or acquiesence, which it had
power to grant, had placed certain cellar and area ways in the
highway. He maintained that the defendant, by carelessly making
4
Clampit v. RBy. Go., 84 Iowa
v. Riy. Co., 103 Iowa 649, also
Iowa 590; Taraslonsky v. iy.
MAs in Papich v. Ry. Co., 183

71, a leading case in this State; Thomas
a strong decision; Heise v. By,. Co., 103
Co., 139 Iowa 709.
Iowa 601, 610.

U6Foz v. Warner-Quftlan etc. Co., 204 N. Y. 240, 97 N. R- 497, criticized
in 25 Harv. L. Rev. 667.
"T See Carskaddon v. Mills, 5 Ind. App. 22, 1 -N. R. 559; Morrow v.
Sweeney, 10 Ind. App. 626, 38 N. E. 187; 'Wheeler v. St. Joqepb etc. Co.,
66 Mo. App. 260; Lepnick v. Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200, and eaes cited in 13
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126.
"Haughey v. Hart, 62 Iowa 96. Tle Court assumed the horse was

rightfully on the land. Compare Beinhorn v. Griswold, 27 Montana 79.
There too, the owner was not liable for the trespasses of the cattle on
defendant's land. But the position was taken that the cattle were no
better than trespassers, and the landowner was not liable for their death
from drinking' cyanide solution left in open vats on his land.
0161 Iowa 338.
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changes in grades and gutters, caused his premises to be flooded,
to his damage. A judgment in his favor was affirmed.
LICENSE Im'Lmn

THROUGH USE.

It is apparent that while the position of trespassers and licensees
are alike in many. respects with regard to their claims against a
landowner, yet there is much practical difference in their rights.
The question comes up most frequently in cases where an injury.
has occurred on a railroad right of way. Some bnd ha been run
over by a train. It is claimed that the defendant's employees did
not see him in time to avert the accident. If the victim was a
trespasser, that is a complete answer to his claim for, damages.
If he was a licensee, under our decisions' he can insist that it was
defendant's business to use care to discover him, and may recover if
they were negligent in that respect, provided that he Was not himself contributorily negligent. 60 Very seldom would a person in such
a situation be able to show an express -permission from the railroad
company to use its land as a thoroughfare. But.in every town
there are portions of the right of way where public use is so frequent that well defined paths are worn along the tracks.' Is one
using such a path to be called a trespasser?
It is said to be the general opinion that an invitation (and presumably permission) cannot be implied from a mere toleration oi
trespassers.61 Here is an instance where local authority is of extreme importance. Our Supreme Court has said that something
more than mere use must be shown to make out a license. There
must be something from which consent may be inferred 2 - But
this statement alone is misleading, because the something more does
not require any affirmative act of assent on the landowner's part.
Many cases have allowed the jury to find a license where property
-

'If he was, then his only chance for recovery is under the Last Clear
Chance doctrine, which is applicable in Iowa only when the plaintif's
peril has been discovered. This is discussed in 5 Iowa Law Bulletin, p. 36.

120 R. C. L. 64.
"Wagner v. Ry. Co., 122 Iowa 360, 366.

Accord, Masser v. By. Co, 68

Iowa 602; Burg v. Ry. Co., 90 Iowa 106.
UEvans v. R. Co., 21 Iowa 374 (semb7e); Murphy v. R. Co., 38 Iowa
539; Masser y. Ry. Co., 68 Iowa 602; Richards v..By. Co., 81 Iowa 426;
Clampit v. Ry. Co., 84 Iowa 71 (a leading case); Thomas v. By. Co., 93
Iowa'248; Thomas v. By. Co., 103 Iowa 649; Booth v. Union Terminal Co.,
126 Iowa 8; Croft v. By. Co., 132 Iowa 687; Caldwell v. By. Co., 138 Iowa
32; Tarashonsy v. Ry. Co, 139 Iowa 709.
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has been constantly used, with the knowledge of the landowner's
employees, (usually a railway)" and no objection hias been made
thereto. 3 "It is the knowledge of the constant use of the tracks
that binds the railroad company."" Nor do these cases require
knowledge on the part of important officials that the use is being
made, though in some of the cases the plaintiff's ease has been
helped by this, or other facts additional, to the known custom. 65
It is a pertinent observation that most of the cases have come before the Supreme Court after a finding of a license by the jury.
If use, plus knowledge of the use without protest, will allow a jury
to infer a license the plaintiff will seldom fail on this ground. And
just that seems to be the rule df our decisions. Limitations on its
application are set out in the note.6
INvITME

PMSONS

The chief difficulty met with in determining the prote.tion owed
by the landowner to "invited persons" or "invitees," is in ascertaining who comes within that class. The orthodox statement is
something like this:
S"But if [the landowneri expressly or by implication invites others to
come upon his premises, it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not
inviting them into a place of danger, and to this' end he must exercise
ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for
the visit."
"Booth v. Union Terminal Co., 126 Iowa 8, 13.
1Clampit v. By. Co., supra; Thomas v. Ry. Co., 103 Iowa 649; Croft v.
Ry. Co., 132 Iowa 687.
"Where a railway company had provided two safe means of entrance
and exit from the station, even the persistent use of a path used by
people as a short cut will not be a foundation for an inference that such
use was permissive. Heiss v. Ry. Co., 103 Iowa 590; followed in Wagner
v. Ry. Co., 122 Iowa 360, S. C. 124 Iowa 462, the railroad having provided
a safe place for people to walk, cinder paths -between the tracks, the
license was limited to use of these paths. Of. Pulley v. By. Co, 94 Iowa
565. And where a path the use of which is licensed crosses a track,
the license is suspended while the path is obatructed by cars. There
is no license to crawl under. Wagner v. Ry. Co., supra; Papichy. Ry. Co,
183 Iowa 601, 608.
Judge Deemer in Rutherford v. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 744, says that the
owner of stock which has escaped on the railroad right of way Is licensed

to go thereon.to recover it.
'This is from Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 407. Equally broad inclusive language may be found in Wilsey v. Jewett,.122 Iowa 315, and in
Gardnerv. 'Waterloo etc. Co., 134 Iowa 6. For similar statements see 20
IP C. L. 55; 2 Coorx- oN Towrs; 3rd. ed. 1259.
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The looseness of this phraseology can be demonstrated by putting two hypothetical cases. A, a landowner, sees his neighbor B
cut across his back yard each day on his way to town, and makes
no objection. This is sufficient, under Iowa decisions, to furnish
a 'basis for inference that B's use is permissive. But it puts A
under no further obligation with regard to the premises than to
give notice of concealed dangers known to him. Presumably B's
status would not change if he asked and received permission from
A to use his yard as a thoroughfare. Now suppose that A, in a
spirit of neighborliness says to B, '!Don't you want to make use
of my yard as a short cut to townI" Does that make B when
he accepts, an invited person in the eyes of the law and impose
upon A the obligation to keep the premises in repair for BI
Civilization will not come to an end whichever way this ease is
decided. But the point has practical importance and we ought to
know the law with certainty. Solution should not be difficult when
the exact issue is defined. Our landowner A gets nothing out of
B's use of the premises in either of the cases supposed. In either
case it is a pure gratuity on A's part; B does not use the path because A asks him to, but -bcanse it is convenient for him and for
his interest to do so. Whn then put on A the burden of making
things safe for B I Would not the more reasonable rule be to place
the affirmative obligation for care of the premises on the landowner only when the visitpr's business concerns the landownerI
The test would be, not whether the visitor comes by acquiesenee
(thus being a bare licensee,) or by outright invitation, but what
does he come for? Is it an errand in which defendant has an interest s Professor Boblen thus states it: "It is submitted that while everyone isbound to refrain from action,
probably injurious to others,. no duty to take affirmative precautions for '
the protection of those voluntarily placing themselves in contact with him
is cast upon any one save as the .price of some benefit to him." I

General statements, then, about a duty to persons present on land
"by invitation express or implied," while good enough in their
way where the plaintif is clearly a business visitor, leave the exact
question unsettled. It is not disputed that there may be found
,'This line of argument is well developed In the brisf of Mr. John L.
Thorndike in the Massachusetts case of Stevens v. Nichols, 155 Mass.
472. It is reprinted in the report of the case which appearis in oA FS AiD
Smrru, ClSrS oN ToRs (Pound's ed.), p. 214.
053 American L. Reg. (0. S.) 209, 220. In the discussion the author

develops the growth of the law upon which this generalization is based.
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more exact statements making the fact of invitation and not the
nature of the 'business as the test of the duty. The following is a
sample:
"The true distinction is this: A mere passive acquiescence by an owner
or occupier. in a certain use of his land by others involves no liability;
but if he directly or by implication induces persons to enter on and pass
over his premises, he thereby assumes an obligation that they are.in a safe
condition suitable for such use, and for a breach of this obligation he is
liable in damages to a person injured thereby.""

On the other hand note the careful statement in S .Answt
REDIED ON NE-LiGsecn:71

AND

"The occupant of land is bound to use ordinary care and diligenceoto
keep the premises in a safe condition"for the access of persons who come
thereon by his invitation, express or implied, for the 'ransaction of busiI
nes, or for any other purpose beneficial to him...........

So Judge Cooley, -who in one place states in the broad language
the rule as to invitation, says later on,7 2
"An invitation may -be inferred when there is a common interest or
mutual advantage, a license when the object is the mere pleasure or bene:it of the person using it."

And a difference in difty based upon the nature of the errand
that brings a stranger upon an owner's premises, finds adequate
support in the cases.75
All this goes to establish as the legal meaning of "invited person" not that of common parlance, but the description of one who
comes on premises in connection with the enterprise carried on
there; the invited person is a "business guest" if a wide meaning
be given the word business. It is worth noticing that however
"Bigelow, C. J., obiter, in Sweeny v. Old Colony R. Co., 92 Mass. 368.
See the explanation of this decision in Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426,
430. Atlanta etc. Go. v. Coffey, 80 La. 145, applies Judge Cooley's broad
language literally. Accord, Central R. Co. v. Robertson, 95 Ga. 430.
"6th ed. § 704. The -italics. are my own.
"CooLEy oN ToRTs, 3rd ed., 1265.
""The class to which the customer belongs includes persons who go
........ upon business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied". Wilies, 9., in lndermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P.
274. For careful judicial language to the same effect, see, Marshall, J., in
Hup/er v. Nat. Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279; Vickers, J., in .Pauclnerv.
Wakem, 231 Ill. 276, 279; Gaynor, J., in Forbriclk v. General Eleat. Co.,
92 N. Y. Supp. 36.
On this ground it has recently been decided in Wisconsin that a social
guest, injured by reason of an alleged dangerous condition in the host's
premises, could not recover. Greenfield v. Miller, 180 N. W. 834, commented upon 19 M3ch L&Rev. 572.
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broadly the statement is made in our Iowa decisions about a landowner's duty to those "present by invitation express or "implied"
all the eases allowing recovery have been those of plaintiffs present
on business in some Way connected with defendant's beneficial use
of the premises.
Once the persons entitled to protection are ascertained, the rule
is clear enough. Visitors of this class are entitled to call for reasonable care on the part of the landowner to' protect them from
harm resulting from the condition of the premises" whether
the peril is known to the landowner or could have been discovered
"Burk v. WaZsh, 118 Iowa 397, customer in a store falls down an un-

guarded elevator shaft. Even if he came in by a way not open to the
public, ,heis entitled to protection once having reached the place where
the public is invited to come; Wlseji v. Jewett, 12a Iowa 315; retailer's
clerk goes to wholesaler's wareroom for goods, falls down an unguarded
shaft in a dark room; Gardner v. Waterloo etc. (Jo., 134 ,Iowa 6,employee
of lumber company brings'ordered merchandise to defendant's premises
and falls into unguarded elevator shaft; Burner v. Higman etc. Co.,
127 Iowa 580, drayman coming -for goods falls into unguarded elevator
shaft; Young v. People's Gas etc. Co., 128.Iowa 290, postman goes to defendant's car barn to pick up mail from boxes carried on street cars in
accordance with contract between postal authorities and defendant, and
falls into open pit; Rnipps v. R. Co.,' 164 Iowa 530, plaintiff injured by
explosion of gas trying, to start pump to water stock in defendant's
yards; G4ibert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, plaintiff admitted as guest in
hotel without being warned of' the known existence of small pox therein.
The customer in a store is a typical case of an "invited person" and
details of the duty owned him have been pietty well worked out. See
collections of cases in 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456; 7,. R. A. 1915 F. 572;
The plaintiff, to re.cover for Injuries caused by condition of the premises,.
must have received .them while inthat part where, he, or people generally,
could rightfully go. "The liability extends no- further than the invitation". iee collection of cases in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119.' The nearest
case found In Iowa.is Oaks v. By. Co., 174 IoWa 648.
Most of the cases involving the r'esponsibility of railroad companies for
failure to provide adequate lights, platforms, depots and the like are
instances of this same duty. While some of the cases where recovery
for injuries is sought against the company may turn on the special relation of carrier and passenger, most of the rules are equally applicable
to protect a person coming to the premises to send a telegram, get Information about freight rates or call for an express 'package. A safe
place to alight from trains must be provided; McDonald v. R. Co., 26
Iowa 124; Merryman v. Ry. Co., 13S Iowa 59;; but this does not Include
persohal assistance usually; see also on this Raben v. By. do., 74 'Iowa
-732, but if assistance Is given, it must not be given. carelessly, Ray v.'
Ry. Co., 163 Iowa 430; McGovern y. By. gJo., 136 Iowa 13.. Care must be
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by-him in the exercise of due care.75 The protection to which the
visitor is entitled extends not only to the premises themselves, but
to what is done there, even by third parties, if the defendant in the
exercise of due care could have anticipated the danger and guarded
against it.78 Our plaintiff may also demand that due care be
taken in the doing of affirative acts by the owner or his servants
on the premises not only after he is known to be there, but also if in
the exercise of care his presence could have been discovered.77
used to provide safe access to trains, Mattieson v. RBy. Co., 125 Iowa 90;
Dieclkiiann v. Biy. go., 145 Iowa 250. Likewise, due care for proper
lighting, Hiatt v. Biy. Co., 96 Iowa 169; DrurAmy v. R. do, 153 Iowa 479;
Whitman v. Biy. Co., 153 N. W. (Iowa) 1023; sed quaere in this case whether
plaintiff was entitled to such protection, see comment in 2 Iowa Law
Bulletin 40; and a safe means of exit must be exercised, Cotant v. Suburban Byj. Co., 125 Iowa 46. Ordinary care is the limit of the obligation;
there is no insurer's liability. McNaughton v. Biy. Co., 136 Iowa 177.
UConnol
oy v. Des Moines Inv. Co, 130 Iowa 633. See Garfield etc.
Coal 0o. v. Rockland etc. Co., 184 Mass. 60, 67 N. E. 863,'for an instance.
"So a railroad is liable for rape committed upon, a passenger by a
brakeman, Garvik v. By. Go., 131 Iowa 415; and an assault on a passenger
by a brakeman, even though the latter is actuated by the motive.of personal revenge. Fagg v. R. Co., 175 Iowa 459. But not for an assault
by strangers that there was no reason to anticipate, Felton v. By. Co.,
69 Iowa 577. The same responsibility has been applied in other thag
carrier-passenger cases. Thus a company maintaining an amusement
park is liable to a colored patron for injuries from an attack from a
crowd of hoodlums, where defendant knew of the threatened danger, but
failed to warn the plaintiff; Indianapolis St. By. 6o. v. Dawson, 31 Ind.
App. 605, 68 N. E. 909. A pool-room proprietor was held liable to '.
customer for injuries in a brawl engaged in by fellow patrons in Moons
v. Smith, 65 S. E. 712. (Ga.) In Williams v. Mineral City Park Assn.,
128 Iowa 32, the plaintiff, a patron of defendant, was struck by a bottle
dropped or thrown by a stranger. The Court refused to. interfere with
a Jury's :nding on the evidence returning a verdict for defendant. The
duty was recognized.
Cases of the responsibility of the proprietor of a theatre, fair, or other
places of amusement furnish the most picturesque examples of the duty
of the land occupant to patrons. For collections of cases see 3 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1132; 19 ibid 772; 32 ibid 713; 42 ibid 1070. The cases in these
annotations treat of the duty as to the premises themselves, and also
the responsibility for failure to protect patrons from the acts of performers and fellow seekers of entertainment.
"7Weymlre v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533, saloonkeeper expels a helplessly intoxicated customer who suffers from exposure; Watson v. By. Co., 66 Iowa
164, teamster unloading lumber injured when car is backed against
lumber car; McoMarhall v. By. Co., 80 Iowa 757, conductor on a ralroad
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Established rules governing contributory negligence are applicable.78 The Iowa decisions are set forth in the notes.
The landowner's liability for unsafe-premises brought about by
lack of adequate precaution in work done by an independent contractor is a troublesome question to settle. In Wood v. Indept.
SchooZ Distiict" the defendant contracted with a firm to dig a well
in the school house yard. Certain machinery used in the work was
negligently left unguarded, and the plaintiff, a pupil in the school.
was injured while playing on the machinery. The Court held the
district not liable, thus stating the rule:
"Where work is contracted to be done which is not of itself dangerous,

but becomes so by the negligence of the contractor, the employer is not
liable for injuries resulting therefrom; but if the work is dangerous of

itself, unless guarded, and the employer makes no provision in his contract for its being guarded, and does not make a proper effort to guard
it himself, then he is negligent, and cannot escape liability on the ground
that the work was done by a contractor. In the case at bar, the work to
be done was not dangerous; it was the machinery with which it was done
that was dangerous. "80
If this kind of a municipal corporation was liable for defective
premises at all"' it is hard to see how it could escape liability fQr
the condition of its premises merely because the condition was
created by the contractor. That defence has been raised in some
of the cases where a proprietor of an amusement place has been sued
for damages from injuries received by patrons during the course
of a performance. The defendant says the show troupe was under
injured while stepping on defendant's adjoining track to signal; Carver
v. By. Co., 120 Iowa 346, mail carrier hit by mail sack carelessly thrown
from itrain; Reilly v. By. Co., 122 Iowa 525; COistiansen v. By. CJo., 140
Iowa 345, plaintiff run into when he went forward to look after hih
stock when train stops.
The rights of persons at failway crossings might be referried to here.
The cases are not directly in point however, because even at a private
crossing the traveller goes upon the property not by defendant's permission or invitation but in his own right See on the general duty

Bettinger Y.Loring, 168 Iowa 103; 'Dombreza8 v. By. Co, 174 N. W. 696;
private crossing, Ressler v. By. Co, 152 Iowa 449.
"Bryson v. By. Co., 89 Iowa 677; Waterbury v. By. 0., 104 Iowa 32.
"44 Iowa 27.
"The rule was approved in Van Wdnter .v. Henry Counsty, 61 Iowa 684,
and applied to'make a county liable for a dangeroue highway.
"A school district is not liable for personal injuries sustained on account of the negligent onstruction of its school-house, or negligence in
failing to keep it in repair. Lane v.District Township, 58 Iowa. 46. See
also D-w m.,MSIOAL Ccxeoa&mohs, Sth ed., If 168-1640.
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the management of an independent contractor, and he is not liable.
But he is held if he failed to take reasonable precautions for his
patrons, to whom he owes an affirmative duty which cannot be
delegated.82" The rules of master and servant, requiring the employer to furnish proper tools-and a reasonably safe place to work
are other instances of this non-delegable duty. The employer is
liable if the duty is not performed, no matter in whose hands the
job of satisfying legal requirements is put by him.88 The Iowa
Court, in th6 case discussed, was quoting a form of the rule applied.
to employers of .independent contractors where no affirmative duty
was owed the particular plaintiff, but where responsibility is sometimes imposed despite that for acts done by the contractor resulting
in another's injury. 81 In a later (and the only other) decision,
our Court shows a clear understanding of the nature of the liability of the owner of premises 5
The responsibility of the lessor or vefidor of property may be
treated very briefly. After sale and when the premises are in possession of the purchaser, the former owner is not liable to one
coming thereon for injuries through an open source of danger
existing when the premises were sold. 6 It is a general rule that
a lessor is not liable to a lessee for open defects existing at the time
of the lease. 87 'General responsibility of landlord to tenanit is not
within this discussion. One well considered case has discussed the
question of the lessor's responsibility to those coming upon the
premises on business with tenants where the lessor retains control
of part of the property. Judge Deemer announced the general rule
that the one who occupies the premises is alone liable, for he is
bound to- keep them in repair. There are, he said, three exceptions; (1) where the landlord retains control over the part of the
premises where the accident takes place; (2) where he and the
mSee cases referred to in note 76 supra.
"MEOHEm oN AGENcy, 2nd ed., §§ 1639-1641.
"The difficulty of this application of liability and the basis for it are
clearly discussed in Dean E. IE. Thayer's "Liability Without Fault", 29
Harv. L. Rev. 801, 808 et seq.
"00ramblittv.. Percival-Porter Co., 176 Iowa 733. The landlord of an
apartment house retained control of halls and stairways. A contractor
engaged in wiring the building took up. a floor'board and failed to
replace it and the tenant fell in the hole. .Though the suit was brought
aainst the agent of the property, the landlord's liability is also dig
aussed.

"Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403.

wHoltoa v. Waler, 95 Iowa 545, 'Willi v. Snyder, 180 N. W. 290.
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tenant are in joint control; (3),where the defect at the time of
the lease constituted a nuisance. In the case itself there was found
such reservation of contr5l on the part of the landlord that a duty
was owed
to one who came on business to the part controlled by the
lessor. 88 '
Finally, there is the question of liability of a landowner to policeman, fireman and similar visitors. They often come for the benefit of the landowner, but they enter by public authority and not his
permission. And often, too, they enter under circumstances that
afford little opportunity for precautions to make the premises safe.
There are no Iowa decisions. Authority generally has held that
the landowner, owes no affirmative duty to this class of visitors,
apart from statute,. 9 but a late New York decision allowed a fireman to recover who fell into unguarded coal hole in a paved driveway on the defendant's property. 0
HERBERT

F. GOODRiCH.

"Burner v. Higman etc. (7o., 127 Iowa 580. A discussion of and authorities upon this 'point may "be found in S-F m&N AND
IRrsnE
ON
NiGFiCE:, 6th ed,, § 708 et. seq., and a series of annotations in IA. R. A.
1916 F 1123. See also the well stated decision by Stevens, J., in WitUs v.
Snyder, 180 N. W. 290, which involved the landlord's liability to a guest
of a tenant.
USee 30 L, R. A. (N. S.) 60 and L. RL A. 1916 B 792 for collections of
cases.
"Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 127 N. E. 491. The decision is commented upon in 30 Yale L. Jour. 93; 34 Harv. . Rev. 87; and is made
the basis of a discussion by Professor F.. H. Bohlen, beginning in 69
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 142, January 1921.

